Epistemic Justice for Animal Testimony

Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice—wrongfully denying someone's knowledge claims—finds profound application through Sor Juana's lens. Animals constantly testify through behavior, vocalizations, and physiological responses about their suffering, fear, preferences, and social bonds. Yet we systematically dismiss this testimony as non-rational, disqualifying it from moral consideration. Sor Juana fought against epistemic injustice when authorities denied women's capacity for knowledge; similarly, we commit epistemic injustice when we deny animal communication as mere instinct. A cow separated from her calf bellows—this is testimony we dismiss. A laboratory animal exhibits stress behaviors—we call it conditioning. A wild animal flees human approach—we interpret it through our framework, not theirs. By recognizing animals as knowers and witnesses to their own experiences, we commit to listening differently. This doesn't require animals speak human language; it requires we stop privileging one form of knowledge-making as the only legitimate form.